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Algorithmic copyright enforcement the use of automated filtering 
tools to detect infringing content before it appears on the internet has a deep 
impact on the freedom of users to upload and share information. Traditional 
liability shields for online platforms that host user-generated content 
-infringement: the content stemming 
from platform users is deemed permissible until the platform provider 
receives a sufficiently substantiated notification of infringement. Only then, 
the contested content must promptly be removed. The employment of upfront 
filtering tools changes this equation substantially. The moment the 
algorithmic enforcement system identifies traces of protected source material 
in a user upload, the content will be blocked automatically and never become 
visible for platform users. Instead of presuming that UGC does not amount 
to infringement unless copyright owners take action and provide proof, the 
default position of automated filtering systems is that every upload is 
suspicious and copyright owners are entitled to ex ante control over the 
sharing of information online.  
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If platform providers voluntarily introduce algorithmic enforcement 
measures, this may be seen as a private decision following from the freedom 
of companies to run their businesses as they wish.1 If, however, copyright 
legislation institutionalizes algorithmic enforcement and imposes a legal 
obligation on platform providers to employ automated filtering tools, the law 
itself transforms copyright into a censorship and filtering instrument. Instead 
of serving as an engine of content creation and dissemination,2 copyright 
protection becomes a central basis for content control in the online world.3 
Nonetheless, the new EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market 
4 follows this path and mandates the 
employment of automated filtering tools to ensure that unauthorized 
copyrighted content does not populate UGC platforms.5 
statutory filtering obligations in EU copyright law (next section 1), the 
following analysis will demonstrate that the new EU rules on UGC licensing 
and screening will inevitably lead to the adoption of algorithmic enforcement 
measures in practice. Without automated content control, UGC platforms 
will be unable to escape liability for infringing user uploads (section 2). To 
provide a complete picture, however, it is important to also shed light on 
counterbalances which may distinguish this new, institutionalized form of 
algorithmic enforcement from known content filtering tools that have 
evolved as voluntary measures in the private sector. The DSM Directive 
 
1 As to the constitutional recognition of the freedom to conduct a business, see Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 16, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. As to the recognition of this 
freedom in the context of platforms for UGC, see Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, 
Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (Sabam) v. Netlog NV, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62010CJ0360, 
¶¶ 45 47, 51. 
2 As to this goal of the copyright system, see Harper v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) 
(characterizing copyright as an engine of free expression ). For a detailed analysis of the interplay 
between copyright protection and freedom of expression, see P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and 
Freedom of Expression in Europe, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 239 (Niva Elkin-Koren 
& Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002); SANDRO MACCIACCHINI, URHEBERRECHT UND 
MEINUNGSFREIHEIT (2000); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Christophe Geiger & 
Elena Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human Rights  Trial: Redefining the Boundaries of Exclusivity 
Through Freedom of Expression, 45 INT L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 316 (2014); Christophe 
Geiger, Constitutionalising  Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on 
Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 INT L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION LAW 371 
(2006); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996); 
ALAIN STROWEL ET AL., DROIT D AUTEUR ET LIBERTÉ EXPRESSION (2006)  
3 Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1093 (2017).  
4 Directive 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92 [hereinafter DSMD].  
5 Id. at art. 17(4)(b). 
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underlines the necessity to safeguard user freedoms that support 
transformative, creative remixes and mash-ups of pre-existing content. This 
feature of the new legislation may offer important incentives to develop 
algorithmic tools that go beyond the mere identification of unauthorized 
takings from protected works. It has the potential to encourage content 
assessment mechanisms that factor the degree of transformative effort and 
user creativity into the equation. As a result, more balanced content filtering 
tools may emerge in the EU. Implementing the new EU rules in their 
domestic legislation,6 EU Member States can pave the way for the described 
reverse filtering logic that focuses on UGC elements that may justify user 
uploads despite the inclusion of protected third-party content (section 3). In 
sum, the new EU legislation not only escalates the use of algorithmic 
enforcement measures that already commenced in the private sector years 
ago. If rightly implemented, it may also add an important nuance to existing 
content identification tools and alleviate the problems arising from reliance 
on automated filtering mechanisms (concluding section 4).   
I.  VALUE GAP ARGUMENT 
UGC is a core element of many internet platforms. With the opportunity 
to upload photos, films, music, and texts, formerly passive users become 
active contributors to (audio-)visual content portals, wikis, online 
marketplaces, discussion and news fora, social networking sites, virtual 
worlds, and academic paper repositories.7 
myriad of literary and artistic works every day.8 A delicate question arising 
from this user-involvement concerns copyright infringement. UGC may 
consist of self-created works and public domain material. However, it may 
also include unauthorized takings of third-party material that enjoys 
copyright protection. As UGC has become a mass phenomenon and a key 
factor in the evolution of the modern, participative web,9 this problem raises 
 
6 EU Directives, such as the new DSM Directive, must be embedded in the national legal system 
of EU Member States within a given period of time. The deadline for domestic implementation of the 
DSM Directive is 7 June 2021. See id. at art. 29(1). 
7 See the overview of UGC application that is provided in ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., PARTICIPATIVE WEB: USER-CREATED CONTENT (2007), available at 
https://www.oecd.org/sti/38393115.pdf [hereinafter OECD]. 
8 For example, statistics relating to the online platform YouTube report over one billion users 
uploading 300 hours of video content every minute. Cf. Youtube for Press, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/intl/en-GB/yt/about/press/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2019); 37 Mind Blowing 
Youtube Facts, Figures, and Statistics 2019, MERCHDOPE (Sept. 29, 2019), 
https://www.statisticbrain.com/youtube-statistics/. 
9 As to the use and discussion of this term, see OECD, supra note 7.  
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complex issues and requires the reconciliation of divergent interests: users, 
platform providers, and copyright holders are central stakeholders.10 
In the legislative process leading to the adoption of the DSM Directive, 
the so-
UGC. The argument rests on the policy objective to ensure the payment of 
adequate remuneration for the online distribution of copyrighted content.11 
Traditionally, EU legislation in the field of e-commerce shielded UGC 
involved in the posting of content, she only was obliged to take immediate 
action and remove content when a rights holder informed her in a sufficiently 
precise and substantiated manner about infringing content (notice-and-
takedown).12 The safe harbour system was based on the assumption that a 
general monitoring obligation would be too heavy a burden for platform 
providers. Without the safe harbour, the liability risk would thwart the 
creation of internet platforms depending on third-party content and frustrate 
the development of e-commerce.13 In its 20
 
10 As to the debate on user-generated content and the need for the reconciliation of divergent 
interests in this area, see Martin R.F. Senftleben, Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business Models: 
Exploring the Matrix of Copyright Limitations, Safe Harbours and Injunctions, J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. 
TECH. & E-COMM. L. 87, 87 90 (2013); Tom W. Bell, The Specter of Copyism v. Blockheaded Authors: 
How User-Generated Content Affects Copyright Policy, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841 (2008); Branwen 
Buckley, SueTube: Web 2.0 and Copyright Infringement, COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235 (2008); Steven 
Hechter, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part One Investiture of Ownership, 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 863 (2008); S.D. Jamar, Crafting Copyright Law to Encourage and Protect 
User-Generated Content in the Internet Social Networking Context, WIDENER L.J. 843 (2010); Mary W.S. 
Wong, Transformative User-Generated Content in Copyright Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair 
Use?, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1075 (2009); Greg Lastowka, User-Generated Content and Virtual 
Worlds, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 893 (2008); Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 
UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 1459 (2008); Natali Helberger et al., Legal Aspects of User Created Content 
(University of Amsterdam, Nov. 14, 2009), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1499333. 
11 For an overview of the discussion on UGC prior to the current copyright reform proposals in 
the EU, see JEAN-PAUL TRIAILLE ET AL., STUDY ON THE APPLICATION OF DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC ON 
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (2013).  
12 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain 
Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 178), art. 
14(1) (hereinafter Directive on E-Commerce). Cf. Case C-236/08, Google v. Google France, 2010, par. 
114 18; case C-324/09, L Oréal v. eBay, 2011, par. 120 22. For commentary, see CHRISTINA 
ANGELOPOULOS, EUROPEAN INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY IN COPYRIGHT: A TORT-BASED ANALYSIS 
(2016); MARTIN HUSOVEC, INJUNCTIONS AGAINST INTERMEDIARIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
ACCOUNTABLE BUT NOT LIABLE? (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017); STEFAN KULK, INTERNET 
INTERMEDIARIES AND COPYRIGHT LAW TOWARDS A FUTURE-PROOF EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK (Univ. 
Utrecht 2018); Miquel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbour and Their European Counterparts: A 
Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems, COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481 (2009); Senftleben, supra 
note 10, at 87 103;  
13 Directive on E-Commerce, supra note 12, at art. 15(1). 
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Commission held the view that the safe harbour for hosting allowed UGC 
platforms to generate income without sharing profits with producers of 
creative content.14 The value gap argument was born. 
copyright legislation the template for the DSM Directive that has now 
entered into force sought to render the liability shield inapplicable when it 
came to copyrighted works.15 The underlying strategy was simple: deprived 
of the safe harbour for hosting and exposed to direct liability for infringing 
user uploads, platform providers would have to embark on UGC licensing 
and filtering. With the erosion of the legal certainty resulting from the 
traditional liability privilege, a platform provider seeking to avoid liability 
risks would enter into agreements with copyright owners. The initial 
Commission proposal already contemplated that these agreements with right 
holders would bring filtering obligations in their wake. The Commission 
16 
Algorithmic enforcement measures, thus, played a central role in the EU 
copyright reform agenda from the outset. The value gap argument and the 
intention to generate new revenue streams for copyright owners served as a 
vehicle to present content filtering obligations as a necessary evil that had to 
be accepted.  
II.  NEW LICENSING AND FILTERING OBLIGATIONS 
Despite the early focus on algorithmic enforcement, an unequivocal 
filtering obligation is sought in vain in the legislative text that evolved from 
 
14 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a Modern, More European 
Copyright Framework, at 9 10, COM (2015) 266 final (Dec. 9, 2015) 
15 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market, art. 13, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016) [hereinafter DSM 
Directive Proposal]. Prior to this formal proposal of copyright legislation seeking to neutralize the safe 
harbour for hosting, the French High Council for Literary and Artistic Property had published a research 
paper prepared by Professor Pierre Sirinelli, Josée-Anne Benazeraf, and Alexandra Bensamoun on 3 
November 2015. The researchers had been asked to propose changes to current EU legislation enabling 
the effective enforcement of copyright and related rights in the digital environment, particularly on 
platforms which disseminate protected content.  They arrived at the conclusion that a provision should be 
added to current EU copyright legislation making it clear that information society service providers that 
give access to the public to copyright works and/or subject-matter, including through the use of automated 
tools, do not benefit from the limitation set out [in the safe harbour for hosting of the E-Commerce 
Directive 2000/31/EC].  See HIGH COUNCIL FOR LITERARY & ARTISTIC PROP. OF THE FRENCH MINISTRY 
OF CULTURE & COMM., MISSION TO LINK DIRECTIVES 2000/31 AND 2001/29  REPORT AND PROPOSALS 
11 (2015) 
16 DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 15, at art. 13(1). 
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the EU copyright reform. Instead of openly embracing algorithmic copyright 
enforcement, the final provision Article 17 DSMD establishes a complex 
matrix of obligations to license and filter UGC. Providers of UGC platforms 
-
legislation)17 can either obtain an authorization from copyright holders to 
offer UGC on their platforms (license approach, following section II.A) or 
take measures to prevent the availability of infringing content from the outset 
(filtering approach, following section II.B).18 A closer look at these ways out 
of the dilemma reveals that both options will inevitably lead to the application 
of algorithmic enforcement measures and raise policy dilemmas in practice.  
A.  Indirect Algorithmic Enforcement Obligations 
At the core of licensing obligations under the new EU copyright 
legislation lies the grant of a specific, exclusive right in Article 17(1) DSMD 
that leads to strict, primary liability of UGC platform providers for infringing 
content that is uploaded by users: 
Member States shall provide that an online content sharing 
service provider performs an act of communication to the 
public or an act of making available to the public when it 
gives the public access to copyright protected works or other 
protected subject matter uploaded by its users.19  
authorization of the copyright owner.20 By clarifying that the activities of 
UGC platform providers amount to communication to the public or making 
available to the public, the new legislation collapses the traditional distinction 
between primary liability of users who upload infringing content, and 
secondary liability of online platforms which encourage or contribute to 
infringing activities. Under Article 17(1) DSMD, it no longer matters 
whether the provider of a UGC platform had knowledge of infringement, 
encouraged infringing uploads or failed to promptly remove infringing 
content after receiving a notification. Instead, the platform provider is 
directly and primarily liable for infringing content that arrives at the 
 
17 As to the scope of the concept of online content-sharing services provider,  see DSMD, supra 
note 4, at art. 2(6).  
18 Id. at art. 17(1). 
19 Id. 
20 Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art. 3, 
annex, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 1, 10. 
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platform.21 In this way, EU legislation incentivizes rights clearance 
initiatives. To reduce the liability risk, the platform provider will have to 
obtain a license.22 To fully understand the scope and reach of this licensing 
obligation, it is necessary to consider the instructions given in Article 17(2) 
DSMD: 
Member States shall provide that when an authorisation has 
been obtained, including via a licensing agreement, by an 
online content sharing service provider, this authorisation 
shall also cover acts carried out by users of the services 
falling within Article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC when they 
are not acting on a commercial basis or their activity does 
not generate significant revenues. 
An online platform seeking to obtain a license for UGC is thus 
confronted with an enormous licensing task. Even though it is unforeseeable 
which content users will upload, the license should ideally encompass the 
whole spectrum of potential posts. This broad licensing obligation seems 
beneficial to users. In line with Article 17(2) DSMD, a UGC license can be 
expected to encompass their activities and minimize their exposure to 
infringement claims. Given the obligation to cover all kinds of non-
commercial user uploads, however, the provision creates a rights clearance 
task which platform providers can hardly ever accomplish.23  
Traditionally, collecting societies have a strong position in the EU. As 
they have far-reaching mandates to administer the rights of copyright owners, 
they seem natural partners in the development of umbrella licensing solutions 
with the scope envisaged in Article 17(2) DSMD. However, they would have 
to offer an all-embracing licensing deal covering not only protected content 
of their members but also content of non-members. Otherwise, the licensing 
exercise makes little sense. It would fail to cover all types of user uploads. 
Considering experiences with licensing packages offered by collecting 
societies in the past, it seems safe to assume that an umbrella solution with 
these proportions is currently unavailable in many EU Member States. It 
remains to be seen whether the implementation of the DSM Directive, 
 
21 DSMD, supra note 4, at art. 17(3), confirms this result by clarifying that the traditional liability 
shield for providers of UGC hosting services shall not apply to the situations covered by this Article.  
22 Id. at art. 17(4)(a). 
23 Cf. Martin R.F. Senftleben, Content Censorship and Council Carelessness Why the 
Parliament Must Safeguard the Open, Participative Web 2.0, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA- & 
INFORMATIERECHT 139, 141 (2018). 
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including harmonized rules on extended collective licensing,24 paves the way 
for broader and more flexible licensing solutions. Even if a platform finds a 
collecting society willing to enter into a UGC agreement with the umbrella 
effect contemplated in Article 17(2), however, a core problem of licenses for 
Europe remains: the collecting society landscape is highly fragmented. The 
UGC deal available in one Member State may remain limited to the territory 
of that Member State. Pan-European licenses are the exception, not the rule. 
If a collecting society offers Pan-European licenses for digital use, these 
licenses will be confined to the specific repertoire, in respect of which the 
collecting society has a cross-border entitlement.25 
Problems also arise in the field of initiatives to obtain licenses directly 
from copyright holders. In the music industry, the willingness to grant 
licenses covering a broad spectrum of musical works may be relatively high. 
Existing services, such as Spotify, demonstrate that far-reaching licenses, 
encompassing recent music releases, are available. In the film industry, 
however, the situation is markedly different. The exploitation of film 
productions traditionally takes place in several stages. The release in cinemas 
is the first step, followed by pay TV exploitation, linear broadcasting on 
regular TV channels, and DVD sales and the distribution via general video-
on-demand services. Film studios are unlikely to sacrifice this profitable 
exploitation cascade by permitting users to share audio-visual material from 
day one of the release in movie theatres. This would enable UGC platforms 
to enter into direct competition with the primary exploitation undertaken by 
the film studio itself. If, despite these concerns, there is willingness to 
conclude UGC licensing agreements, film studios will only accept 
agreements with limited use permissions that do not jeopardize their own 
opportunities to exploit the film in several stages and uphold the traditional 
exploitation cascade.  
 
24 DSMD, supra note 4, at art. 12. As to the discussion of extended licensing solutions in the area 
of orphan works, see Stef van Gompel, Unlocking the Potential of Pre-Existing Content: How to Address 
the Issue of Orphan Works in Europe?, 38 INT L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 669 (2007). 
25 For a detailed analysis of current EU rights clearance challenges in the digital environment, see 
SEBASTIAN FELIX SCHWEMER, LICENSING AND ACCESS TO CONTENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
REGULATION BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND COMPETITION LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 2019). As to 
previous cases triggered by the rights clearance infrastructure in the EU, see Summary of Commission 
Decision 2008/C 323/08 of 16 July 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and 
Art. 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/C-2/38.698  CISAC), 2008 O.J. (C 323) 1, 12; Commission 
Recommendation 2005/737 of 18 May 2005 on Collective Cross-Border Management of Copyright and 
Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services (2005/737/EC), 2005 O.J. (L 276) 1, 54. Cf. Kamiel 
Koelman, Op naar de Euro-Buma(s): de Aanbeveling van de Europese Commissie over 
grensoverschrijdend collectief rechtenbeheer, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA- EN 
INFORMATIERECHT, 191 96 (2005). 
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UGC licensing under Article 17(1) and (2) DSMD is thus unlikely to 
preserve the current participative web 2.0. As long as licensing deals cover 
only a limited spectrum of repertoire and include several restrictions on the 
s will 
no longer enjoy the freedom of uploading remixes and mash-ups of all kinds 
of pre-existing material in the EU. Instead, they will only be able to upload 
content that falls within the scope of the licensing agreement, which the UGC 
platform managed to conclude with copyright holders and collecting 
societies. As a corollary, UGC platforms will no longer offer the content 
diversity that is currently available. In the absence of umbrella licenses 
covering all kinds of UGC (and all EU Member States), the platforms will 
have to limit the spectrum of content and the extent of use (in terms of scope 
and reach of takings from protected works) to licensed material, permitted 
use modalities, and covered territories.  
Given these restrictions, the licensing approach, inevitably, leads to the 
introduction of filtering tools. As copyright holders and collecting societies 
are unlikely to offer all-embracing umbrella licenses, UGC platforms are 
likely to rely on algorithmic tools to ensure that content uploads do not 
overstep the limits of the use permissions they managed to obtain. Hence, 
licenses for UGC are a starting point for algorithmic enforcement measures. 
Upload filtering will be necessary to police the borders of the use permissions 
received from copyright owners and collecting societies. The licensing 
approach will lead to the use of filtering tools to ensure the congruence of 
user uploads with the use permissions given by copyright holders and 
collecting societies.  
In accordance with the limits of licensing deals which UGC platforms 
manage to conclude, algorithmic enforcement measures will curtail the 
freedom of users to participate actively in the creation of online content. If a 
user-generated remix is not in line with the repertoire and use restrictions 
following from licensing deals, it will not pass the content filter. As a 
corollary, the licensing approach will curtail the possibility of users to learn 
of views and expressions of others. UGC portals relying on licensing deals 
will find it difficult to provide access to the wide variety of content that is 
uploaded by users with diverse social, cultural, and ethnical backgrounds. 
Platform providers following the licensing approach are likely to focus on 
mainstream works and the biggest language groups to maximize the return 
on investment in rights clearance. Hence, the risk of UGC impoverishment 
must not be underestimated. The focus on mainstream works and big 
language groups entails the risk of neglecting minority groups, minority 
views, and niche audiences. In light of the cultural diversity in and across EU 
Member States, this problem is serious.  
308 FIU Law Review [Vol. 14:299 
 
Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that big players in the UGC platform 
arena with various establishments across the EU will have less difficulty 
to obtain licenses in different Member States with different languages and 
different rules on license agreements. The licensing option may thus give big 
players a competitive advantage that leads to further market concentration. 
The corrosive effect of licensing obligations in the field of UGC is thus 
twofold. It concerns the diversity of content and, at the same time, the 
spectrum of service providers. On balance, the licensing scenario and 
accompanying algorithmic enforcement measures are problematic from the 
perspective of both public and private interests. 
B.  Direct Algorithmic Enforcement Obligations 
As an alternative, Article 17(4) DSMD offers UGC platforms the 
prospect of a reduction of the liability risk in exchange for content filtering. 
If a UGC platform despite best efforts26  has not received a license, it can 
avoid liability for unauthorized acts of communication to the public or 
making available to the public when it manages to demonstrate that it: 
[M]ade, in accordance with high industry standards of 
professional diligence, best efforts to ensure the 
unavailability of specific works and other subject matter for 
which the rightholders have provided the service providers 
with the relevant and necessary information.27 
Although the provision contains neutral terms to describe this 
of specific works and ot
automated filtering tools seems inescapable to ensure that unauthorized 
protected content does not populate UGC platforms. This filtering approach 
reflects the aforementioned remarkable transformation of copyright law into 
a censorship instrument. Inevitably, it raises the question whether the 
obligation to use filtering tools violates higher ranking, constitutional norms. 
Does EU copyright legislation encroach upon fundamental freedoms when 
institutionalizing algorithmic enforcement?  
EU primary law, in particular the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (CFR), sets direct limits to inroads into user freedoms and 
measures which EU legislators may impose on information society service 
providers, including providers of UGC platforms. The Court of Justice of the 
 
26 DSMD, supra note 4, at art.17(4)(a). 
27 Id. at art. 17(4)(b).  
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EU (CJEU) has stated explicitly that in transposing EU directives and 
implementing transposing measures,  
Member States must . . . take care to rely on an interpretation 
of the directives which allows a fair balance to be struck 
between the various fundamental rights protected by the 
Community legal order.28 
Interestingly, the application of filtering technology to a social media 
platform hosting UGC already occupied center stage in Sabam/Netlog. The 
could be filled with photos, texts, video clips, etc.29 Claiming that users make 
unauthorized use of music and films belonging to its repertoire, the collecting 
society Sabam sought to obtain an injunction obliging Netlog to install a 
s expense, this system would have applied 
indiscriminately to all users for an unlimited period and would have been 
capable of identifying electronic files containing music and films from the 
Sabam repertoire. In the case of a match, the system would have prevented 
relevant files from being made available to the public.30 Given these 
underlying facts, the Sabam/Netlog case offered the CJEU the chance to 
provide guidance on a filtering system that may become a standard measure 
under Article 17(4)(b) of the DSMD.  
However, the CJEU did not arrive at the conclusion that such a filtering 
system could be deemed permissible. Instead, the Court saw a serious 
infringement of fundamental rights. It took as a starting point the explicit 
recognition of intellectual property as a fundamental right in Article 17(2) of 
the CFR. At the same time, the Court recognized that intellectual property 
must be balanced against the protection of other fundamental rights and 
freedoms.31 Weighing the right to intellectual property asserted by Sabam 
Article 16 of the CFR, the Court observed that the filtering system would 
interests of copyright holders, would have no limitation in time, would be 
directed at all future infringements, and would be intended to protect not only 
 
28 Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España SAU, 
2008 E.C.R. I-00271, ¶ 68. 
29 Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (Sabam) 
v. Netlog NV, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62010CJ0360, ¶¶ 16 18 (Feb. 16, 2012). 
30 Id. ¶¶ 26, 36 37. 
31 Id. ¶¶ 41 44. 
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existing but also future works.32 Against this background, the CJEU 
concluded that the filtering system would encroach 
to conduct a business: 
Accordingly, such an injunction would result in a serious 
infringement of the freedom of the hosting service provider 
to conduct its business since it would require that hosting 
service provider to install a complicated, costly, permanent 
computer system at its own expense, which would also be 
contrary to the conditions laid down in Article 3(1) of 
Directive 2004/48, which requires that measures to ensure 
the respect of intellectual property rights should not be 
unnecessarily complicated or costly (see, by analogy, Scarlet 
Extended, paragraph 48).33 
The CJEU also found that the filtering system would violate the 
their personal data and their freedom to receive or impart information, as 
safeguarded by Articles 8 and 11 of the CFR respectively.34 The Court 
recalled that the use of protected material in online communications may be 
lawful under statutory limitations of copyright in the Member States, and that 
some works may have already entered the public domain or been made 
available for free by the authors concerned.35 Given this corrosive effect on 
fundamental rights, the Court concluded: 
Consequently, it must be held that, in adopting the injunction 
requiring the hosting service provider to install the contested 
filtering system, the national court concerned would not be 
respecting the requirement that a fair balance be struck 
between the right to intellectual property, on the one hand, 
and the freedom to conduct business, the right to protection 
of personal data and the freedom to receive or impart 
information, on the other (see, by analogy, Scarlet Extended, 
paragraph 53).36 
In the light of this case law, it can hardly be concluded that the filtering 
obligation that can be deduced from Article 17(4)(b) of the DSMD is 
unproblematic. By contrast, it is likely to encroach upon the fundamental 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under Articles 8, 11, and 16 of the CFR.  
 
32 Id. ¶ 45. 
33 Id. ¶¶ 46 47. 
34 Id. ¶¶ 48 50. 
35 Id. ¶ 50. 
36 Id. ¶ 51. 
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Admittedly, Sabam/Netlog concerned a general monitoring obligation 
targeting all types of content which users may upload. The drafters of Article 
17(4)(b) of the DSMD seem to make an attempt to distinguish the 
institutionalization of algorithmic enforcement from this general monitoring 
obligation and escape the verdict of an infringement of fundamental rights by 
for which the rightholders have provided the service providers with the 
37 The intention to obviate the 
impression of a general monitoring obligation also seems to lie at the core of 
Article 17(8) of the DSMD. This provision declares that UGC licensing and 
38 
However, the success of this strategy is doubtful. It would come as a 
surprise if the content industry made a specific selection of works when 
sending copyright information to UGC platform providers in line with Article 
17(4)(b) of the DSMD. It seems more realistic that platform providers will 
receive long lists of all works which copyright holders have in their 
39 included 
in right holder notifications, the conclusion may be inescapable that Article 
17(4)(b) of the DSMD culminates in a filtering obligation that corresponds 
with the filtering measures which the CJEU prohibited in Sabam/Netlog.    
Given this risk, it is surprising that Article 17 of the DSMD leaves the 
question unanswered in which way the legislator seeks to prevent excessive 
content filtering. Article 17(4)(b) of the DSMD refers to 
standards of professional diligence.
diligent cooperation, however, it is to be considered that decisions following 
from industry roundtables will be aligned with efficiency considerations. 
Industry decisions can be expected to be rational in the sense that they seek 
to achieve content filtering at minimal costs.  
Hence, there is no guarantee that industry cooperation in the field of 
UGC will lead to the adoption of the most sophisticated filtering systems with 
the highest potential to avoid unjustified content removals of mash-ups and 
remixes. A test of proportionality is unlikely to occupy center stage unless 
the least intrusive measure also constitutes the least costly measure. While 
Article 17(5) of the DSMD provides guidelines for the assessment of the 
the 
type of works or other 
 
37 DSMD, supra note 4, at art. 17(4)(b). 
38 Id. at art. 17(8). 
39 Id. at art. 17(4)(b). 
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cost for service providers. 40 Cost and efficiency factors are decisive. It is 
conceivable that these factors encourage the adoption of cheap and 
unsophisticated filtering tools that lead to excessive content blocking. A 
UGC platform seeking to minimize the risk of liability is likely to succumb 
to the temptation of overblocking.41 Filtering more than necessary is less 
risky than filtering only clear-cut cases of infringement. After all, the 
primary, direct liability for infringing user uploads, which follows from 
Article 17(1) of the DSMD, is hanging above the head of UGC platform 
providers like the sword of Damocles. In addition, incentives or obligations 
to prevent overblocking are sought in vain in Article 17 of the DSMD. As the 
indirect algorithmic enforcement obligations that will arise from the 
unavailability of umbrella licenses for UGC, the direct legal obligation of 
content filtering (that arises in the absence of licensing deals) raises serious 
concerns about an encroachment upon public and private interests. 
III.  SAFEGUARDS FOR TRANSFORMATIVE USE 
However, the new EU legislation is not only about licensing and 
filtering, but also about measures to preserve breathing space for 
transformative forms of UGC.42 Article 17(7) of the DSMD underlines the 
need to safeguard copyright limitations for creative remix activities, in 
43 As these use privileges enhance freedom 
of expression and information, they are important counterbalances (following 
section III.A).44 If the exemption of UGC is based on these use privileges and 
 
40 Id. at art. 17(5).  
41 Cf. Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 
19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473, 490 91(2016). For empirical studies pointing towards overblocking, see 
Sharon Bar-Ziv & Niva Elkin-Koren, Behind the Scenes of Online Copyright Enforcement: Empirical 
Evidence on Notice & Takedown, 50 CONN. L. REV. 339, 377 (2018) ( Overall, the N&TD regime has 
become fertile ground for illegitimate censorship and removal of potentially legitimate materials. ); 
Jennifer M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, 2 (UC Berkeley Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2755628, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2755628 ( About 
30% of takedown requests were potentially problematic. In one in twenty-five cases, targeted content did 
not match the identified infringed work, suggesting that 4.5 million requests in the entire six-month data 
set were fundamentally flawed. Another 19% of the requests raised questions about whether they had 
sufficiently identified the allegedly infringed work or the allegedly infringing material. ). 
42 Martin Senftleben, Bermuda Triangle Licensing, Filtering and Privileging User-Generated 
Content Under the New Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, 41 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
480, 480 90 (2019).  
43 DSMD, supra note 4, at art. 17(7)(a) (b). 
44 P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Martin R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe: In Search of Flexibilities, 
29 30 (University of Amsterdam 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959554. For a discussion 
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combined with the payment of equitable remuneration, Article 17(7) of the 
DSMD can even generate new revenue streams that support the general 
policy objective of the new EU legislation to close the value gap (section 
III.B). To implement this new limitation infrastructure in their national laws, 
understood to encompass content medleys of users which go beyond the 
-ended 
UGC (section III.C). Even though platform providers will still have to 
distinguish between permissible pastiche and prohibited piracy, the 
introduction of new use privileges for UGC is an important step in the right 
direction because it is a gateway to the development of algorithmic tools that 
follow a different filtering logic. Instead of focusing on traces of protected 
third-party content that may render user uploads impermissible, a filtering 
system looking for quotations, parodies, and pastiches focuses on creative 
user input that may justify the unauthorized upload (section III.D). Until 
algorithmic enforcement tools with this reverse filtering logic become widely 
available, complaint and redress mechanisms will play a crucial role for 
creative users in the EU (section III.E). 
A.  Impact of Freedom of Expression 
Article 17(7) of the DSMD leaves little doubt that the use of algorithmic 
enforcement measures must not submerge areas of freedom for the creation 
and dissemination of transformative amateur productions that are uploaded 
to UGC platforms: 
The cooperation between online content-sharing service 
providers and rightholders shall not result in the prevention 
of the availability of works or other subject matter uploaded 
by users, which do not infringe copyright and related rights, 
including where such works or other subject matter are 
covered by an exception or limitation.  
Member States shall ensure that users in each Member State 
are able to rely on any of the following existing exceptions 
or limitations when uploading and making available content 
generated by users on online content-sharing services:  
(a) quotation, criticism, review;  
 
of new UGC use privileges under the umbrella of EU copyright law, see TRIAILLE ET AL., supra note 11, 
at 522 27, 531 34.  
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(b) use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche.45  
The formulation 
that users . . 
(k) of the Information Society Directive 2001/29/EC (ISD),46 these use 
privileges were only listed as limitation prototypes which EU Member States 
are free to introduce (or maintain) at the national level. The adoption of a 
quotation right47 and an exemption of caricature, parody, or pastiche48 
remained optional. Article 17(7) of the DSMD, however, transforms these 
use privileges into mandatory breathing space for transformative UGC at 
least in the specific context of algorithmic enforcement measures taken by 
platform providers.49 This metamorphosis makes copyright limitations in this 
automated filtering tools.  
Traditionally, copyright limitations have been interpreted restrictively 
in the EU.50 In line with the traditional approach in EU Member States, the 
CJEU adhered to the dogma of strict interpretation in Infopaq.51 The 
effective 
arguments against excessive UGC filtering. In Painer, the CJEU underlined 
the need for an interpretation of the quotation right following from Article 
5(3)(d) of the ISD that enables its effectiveness and safeguards its purpose.52 
The Court clari
fair balance between the right of freedom of expression of users of a work or 
other protected subject-matter and the reproduction right conferred on 
 
45 DSMD, supra note 4, at art. 17(7). 
46 Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5(3)(d), (k), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17 (EC). 
47 Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5(3)(d), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17 (EC). 
48 Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5(3)(k), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17 (EC). 
49 Cf. J. Quintais, et al., Safeguarding User Freedoms in Implementing Article 17 of the Copyright 
in the Digital Single Market Directive: Recommendations From European Academics 2 (University of 
Amsterdam  Institute for Information Law, Nov. 21, 2019), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3484968. 
50 As to the underlying differences in the theoretical underpinning and practical configuration of 
copyright protection in common law and civil law jurisdictions, see Martin R.F. Senftleben, Bridging the 
Differences Between Copyright s Legal Traditions the Emerging EC Fair Use Doctrine, 57 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC Y U.S. 521, 522 25 (2010). But see J.C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary 
Property in Revolutionary France and America, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS, 131, 133 (B. Sherman & 
A. Strowel eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994), who points out that the antagonism between copyright s 
legal traditions must not be overestimated from a historical perspective. 
51 Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 E.C.R. I 06569. 
52 Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH, 2011 E.C.R. I 12533.  
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53 In its further decision in Deckmyn, the CJEU followed the same 
path with regard to the parody exemption in Article 5(3)(k) of the ISD. As in 
Painer, the Court bypassed the dogma of strict interpretation and underlined 
the need to ensure the effectiveness of the parody exemption54 as a means to 
balance copyright protection against freedom of expression.55  
is capable of providing reliable breathing space for UGC evolving from the 
transformative use of protected pre-existing works. As the decisions of the 
CJEU demonstrate, the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression 
plays a crucial role in this context.56 Relying on Article 11 of the CFR and 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the CJEU 
interpreted the quotation right and the parody exemption less strictly than 
limitations without a comparably strong freedom of speech underpinning.57 
In both the Painer and the Deckmyn decision, the Court emphasized the need 
authors on the one hand, and the rights of users of protected subject-matter 
58 The Court thus referred to quotations and parodies as user 
 
As long as UGC is the result of creative efforts that add value to 
underlying source material,59 user-generated remixes, and mash-ups of third-
party content can be qualified as a specific form of transformative use falling 
under Article 11 of the CFR and Article 10 of the ECHR. Arguably, the 
also relevant to other categories of creative UGC: as a copyright rule that 
seeks to strike a balance between copyright protection and freedom of 
expression, an exemption of UGC creation and dissemination must not be 
interpreted strictly.  
 
53 Id.  
54 Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2132 (Sept. 3, 2014). 
55 Id.  
56 For a discussion of the status quo reached in balancing copyright protection against freedom of 
expression, see 
Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Freedom of Expression as an External Limitation to Copyright 
Law in the EU: The Advocate General of the CJEU Shows the Way, 41 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 131, 
133 36 (2019). 
57 As to the influence of freedom of speech guarantees on copyright law in the EU, see 
MACCIACCHINI, supra note 2; Benkler, supra note 2 Geiger, supra note 2; Geiger & Izyumenko, supra 
note 2; Hugenholtz, supra note 2; Netanel, supra note 2; Strowel, supra note 2. 
58 Case C-145/10, Painer v. VerlagsGmbh, 2011 E.C.R. I-12533, ¶ 132; Case C-201/13, Deckmyn 
v. Vandersteen, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2132 (Sept. 3, 2014), ¶ 26; see also Case C-476/17, 
Pelham GmbH v. Hütter, 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62017CA0476, ¶¶ 32, 37, 59 (July 29, 2019). 
59 OECD, supra note 7, at 8. 
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B.  Payment of Equitable Remuneration 
To further enhance the effectiveness of the copyright limitations listed 
in Article 17(7) of the DSMD, it is advisable to consider the policy dimension 
of the filtering debate in the EU. As explained above, the new algorithmic 
enforcement obligations flow from the desire to ensure the payment of 
adequate remuneration for the use of copyrighted source material in the 
context of UGC creation and dissemination. For courts hearing a case about 
excessive content filtering, this policy objective may be a reason to take a 
cautious approach to copyright limitations. Judges may feel that broad UGC 
privileges deprive copyright owners of the opportunity to prohibit UGC 
dissemination unless they are adequately paid for authorizing the use.  
With regard to this concern about the loss of a new source of income, 
however, it is to be considered that copyright limitations need not be equated 
with use free of charge in an EU context. While the US fair use doctrine does 
not provide for the payment of equitable remuneration,60 the inclusion of this 
feature is not incompatible in the EU. The payment of fair compensation 
constitutes an important aspect of the limitation system in the Information 
Society Directive and the copyright acts of many EU Member States.61 It is 
understood to enhance the breathing space for unauthorized use. When the 
permission of a specific form of unauthorized use seems desirable even 
though it has a deep impact on the position of the right owner, the payment 
of equitable remuneration constitutes an additional balancing tool that can be 
used to minimize the corrosive effect of the use privilege. The offer of 
remuneration reduces the harm flowing from a broad copyright limitation to 
an acceptable, reasonable level. The far-reaching exemption of digital private 
copying in the EU reflects the remarkable potential of lumpsum remuneration 




61 In certain cases of exceptions or limitations, rightholders should receive fair compensation to 
compensate them adequately for the use made of their protected works or other subject-matter. When 
determining the form, detailed arrangements, and possible level of such fair compensation, account 
should be taken of the particular circumstances of each case. When evaluating these circumstances, 
a valuable criterion would be the possible harm to the rightholders resulting from the act in question. 
Directive 2001/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation 
of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 35. 
62 A remuneration-based solution of the private copying dilemma has been chosen in Article 
5(2)(a) and (b) ISD. As to the problem of finding appropriate parameters for determining the right amount 
of remuneration, see Case C-467/08, Editores v. Padawan, 2010 E.C.R. I-10055, ¶ 49; Case C-457/11 to 
C-460/11, VG Wort v. KYOCERA Document Solutions Deutschland, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 
62011CA0457 ¶¶ 76 77 (June 27, 2013); Case C-521/11, Amazon.com Int l Sales Inc. v. Austro-Mechana 
Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung mechanisch-musikalischer Urheberrechte Gesellschaft mbH, 2013 EUR-
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remuneration mechanism can also substantially enhance the room to 
maneuver in the area of UGC. As it generates a revenue stream, it becomes 
possible to provide for a broad UGC privilege while, at the same time, 
ensuring the payment of remuneration and supporting the policy objective of 
the new EU legislation to close the value gap. In a nutshell, a remunerated 
copyright limitation for UGC creation and dissemination only deprives 
copyright owners of their right to categorically prohibit use. It need not 
deprive copyright owners of a new source of income. 
The nature of UGC offers useful starting points for the introduction of 
remuneration systems without damaging the long-standing rule that 
quotations and parodies are free of charge.63 The degree of transformative 
effort in UGC cases is not always comparable with the degree of 
transformation in quotation and parody scenarios. Instead of modifying or 
making a critical comment on protected third-party material, a user-generated 
remix or mash-up may simply combine pre-
own creation. This remix or mash-up character of UGC may preclude the 
successful invocation of the right of quotation. In Pelham, the CJEU held that 
an essential characteristic of a quotation was  
the use, by a user other than the copyright holder, of a work 
or, more generally, of an extract from a work for the 
purposes of illustrating an assertion, of defending an opinion 
or of allowing an intellectual comparison between that work 
and the assertions of that user, since the user of a protected 
work wishing to rely on the quotation exception must 
therefore have the intention of 
that work . . . .64 
 
Lex CELEX LEXIS 62011CA0521 ¶ 24 (July 11, 2013); Case C-435/12, Aci Adam BV v. Stichting de 
Thuiskopie, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CA0435 ¶ 52 (Apr. 10, 2014); Case C-463/12, 
Båndkopi v. Danmark, 2015 E.C.R. 144, ¶ 23 (Mar. 5, 2015). 
63 Article 5(3)(d) and (k) ISD do not provide for the payment of remuneration. This corresponds 
with the legal traditions in EU Member States. Traditionally, the strong freedom of expression 
underpinning of the right of quotation and the exemption of parody the high degree of creative effort 
added by the user led to the permission of quotations and parodies without any financial compensation. 
Cf. TRIAILLE ET AL., supra note 11, at 465 72, 476 81; Reto M. Hilty & Martin R.F. Senftleben, 
Rückschnitt durch Differenzierung? Wege zur Reduktion dysfunktionaler Effekte des Urheberrechts auf 
Kreativ- und Angebotsmärkte, in VOM MAGNETTONBAND ZU SOCIAL MEDIA FESTSCHRIFT 50 JAHRE 
URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ (URHG) 317, 325 28 (Thomas Dreier & Reto Hilty eds., 2015); Martin R.F. 
Senftleben, Quotations, Parody and Fair Use, in 1912 2012: A CENTURY OF DUTCH COPYRIGHT LAW 
345, 351 54 (Bernt Hugenholtz et al. eds., 2012). 
64 Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter, 2019 Eur-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62017CA0476, ¶ 71 
(July 29, 2019). As to the background of this decision, see L. Bently et al., Sound Sampling, a Permitted 
Use Under EU Copyright Law? Opinion of the European Copyright Society in Relation to the Pending 
Reference Before the CJEU in Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter, 50 INT L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 467, 486 87 (2019). 
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As Lionel Bently and Tanya Aplin have shown, this approach to the 
right of quotation may be incompatible with the international quotation 
standard laid down in Article 10(1) of the Berne Convention where limiting 
preconditions for the invocation of the use privilege, such as shortness, non-
modification, incorporation, referencing back or distinctness, are sought in 
vain. Bently and Aplin conclude that the ordinary meaning, which the term 
has across the entire spectrum of work categories and artistic practices, 
should serve as a basis for 65 
This approach does not support a restrictive dialogue requirement that may 
be deduced from the CJEU statement in Pelham.  
relaxed its Pelham conditions, however, UGC may still include a protected 
-existing content is simply added to enrich 
UGC (background music for a funny animal video can serve as an example), 
it will remain difficult to qualify the use as a permissible quotation. This 
result, however, can serve as a starting point for the development of a 
remunerated UGC privilege that goes beyond the right of quotation and the 
exemption of parody. The lower degree of creative input in the animal video 
example does not pose an insuperable obstacle. By contrast, it offers a 
starting point for efforts to establish a new revenue stream. The underlying 
logic is simple: the payment of equitable remuneration counterbalances the 
lower degree of creative investment in the transformation of source material. 
To the extent that the harm flowing from a broad UGC use privilege seems 
unreasonable because of limited creative input, the payment of equitable 
remuneration reduces this unreasonable prejudice to a permissible, 
reasonable level.66 Taking the EU regulation of private copying as a reference 
point,67 a corresponding UGC exemption in EU copyright law could be 
 
65 Tanya Aplin & Lionel Bently, Displacing the Dominance of the Three-Step Test: The Role of 
Global, Mandatory Fair Use, in COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW (Wee Loon Ng et al. eds., forthcoming), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119056; 
Lionel Bently & Tanya Aplin, Whatever Became of Global Mandatory Fair Use? A Case Study in 
Dysfunctional Pluralism, in IS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PLURALISM FUNCTIONAL? (Susy Frankel ed., 
forthcoming), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119041.  
66 Cf. the overarching rule for the regulation of copyright limitations in the EU that is laid down 
in Article 5(5) of the ISD and modelled on the international three-step tests in Article 9(2) BC, Article 13 
TRIPS and Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty. For a more detailed discussion of this solution in 
the light of the three-step test, see Martin R.F. Senftleben, User-Generated Content Towards a New Use 
Privilege in EU Copyright Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON IP AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES (T. Aplin 
ed., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, forthcoming), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3325017; TRIAILLE 
ET AL., supra note 11, at 531 34. See also the discussion of three-step test compliance of a UGC exemption 
by Peter K. Yu, Can the Canadian UGC Exception Be Transplanted Abroad?, 26 INTELL. PROP. J. 175, 
195 96 (2014). 
67 As to the conceptual contours of the private copying levy system in the EU, see Case C-463/12, 
Båndkopi v. Danmark, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CA0463 ¶ 23 (Mar. 5, 2015); Case C-
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configured as follows: users could remain free to create and upload content 
mash-ups and remixes even if they do not fall within the scope of the right of 
quotation and the exemption of parody. Providers of UGC platforms, 
however, would be obliged to pay equitable remuneration for the 
dissemination of UGC that falls within the scope of the new, broadened UGC 
privilege.68  
In comparison with the described problems arising from licensing and 
filtering obligations, this reliance on a remunerated UGC privilege has the 
advantage of creating a continuous revenue stream for authors and 
performers. While licensing and filtering agreements between copyright 
owners and platform providers may predominantly benefit the content 
industry, the repartitioning scheme of collecting societies receiving UGC 
levy payments could ensure that authors and performers obtain a substantial 
part of the UGC remuneration, even if they have transferred their copyright 
and neighboring rights to exploiters of their works and performances.69 The 
value gap problem could thus be solved in a way that benefits not only the 
creative industry but also individual creators of content. 
parody and quotation cases and other forms of UGC. Insofar as UGC falls 
 
435/12, Aci Adam BV v. Stichting de Thuiskopie, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CA0435 ¶ 52 
(Apr. 10, 2014); Case C-521/11, Amazon.com Int l Sales Inc. v. Austro-Mechana Gesellschaft zur 
Wahrnehmung mechanisch-musikalischer Urheberrechte Gesellschaft mbH, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX 
LEXIS 62011CA0521 ¶ 24 (July 11, 2013); Case C-457/11 to C-460/11, VG Wort v. KYOCERA 
Document Solutions Deutschland, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62011CA0457 ¶ 76 77 (June 27, 
2013); Case C-467/08, Padawan SL v. Sociedad General de Autores y Editores, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX 
LEXIS 62008CA0467 ¶ 49 (Oct. 21, 2010). As to the use of private copying regimes as a reference point 
for generating a robust revenue stream, see Christophe Geiger, Freedom of Artistic Creativity and 
Copyright Law: A Compatible Combination?, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 413, 450 51 (2018).  
68 Cf. Matthias Leistner, Copyright Law on the Internet in Need of Reform: Hyperlinks, Online 
Platforms and Aggregators, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 136, 146 49 (2017); Matthias Leistner & 
Axel Metzger, Wie sich das Problem illegaler Musiknutzung lösen lässt, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 
ZEITUNG (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien/gema-youtube-wie-sich-
urheberrechts-streit-schlichten-liesse-14601949-p2.html; Hilty & Senftleben, supra note 63, at 327 28. 
69 In the context of repartitioning schemes of collecting societies, the individual creator has a 
relatively strong position. As to national case law explicitly stating that a remuneration right leads to an 
improvement of the income situation of the individual creator (and may be preferable over an exclusive 
right to prohibit use for this reason), see BGH Jul. 11, 2002, I ZR 255/00, 
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&Datum=Aktuell&anz=1&pos=0&nr=13358&li
nked=pm&Blank=1. For a discussion of the individual creator s entitlement to income from the payment 
of equitable remuneration, see JOÃO P. QUINTAIS, COPYRIGHT IN THE AGE OF ONLINE ACCESS
ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION SYSTEMS IN EU LAW 335 36, 340 41, 347 49, 356 57 (2017); Guido 
Westkamp, The Three-Step Test  and Copyright Limitations in Europe: European Copyright Law 
Between Approximation and National Decision Making, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC Y U.S. 1, 55 59 (2008); 
EUR. COPYRIGHT SOC Y, OPINION ON REPROBEL (2015), https://europeancopyrightsociety.org/opinion-
on-reprobel/.  
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within the scope of the traditional right of quotation or the traditional parody 
exemption, no payment of equitable remuneration is necessary. Because of 
the creative effort involved, these use privileges have a strong freedom of 
expression underpinning and do not require the payment of remuneration. 
Accordingly, Article 5(3)(d) of the ISD and Article 5(3)(k) of the ISD permit 
the adoption of these user rights70 without providing for the payment of 
remuneration.71 If, by contrast, UGC falls outside the scope of the right of 
quotation and the parody exemption because of insufficient transformative 
input to satisfy high quotation or parody standards, the broadening of existing 
use privileges is necessary, and the payment of equitable remuneration is 
advisable for the described reasons.72  
C.  Pastiche Exemption as a Statutory Basis 
In the absence of an open-ended fair use rule in the EU,73 however, this 
plea for a new UGC privilege can only lead to practical results if an 
alternative statutory basis can be found in the existing canon of permissible 
use privileges in EU copyright law. EU Member States seeking to devise a 
new use privilege for UGC creation and dissemination must find a concept 
in the closed list of permissible copyright limitations in Article 5(3) of the 
ISD and the list of filter-proof limitations in Article 17(7) of the DSMD, the 
usual meaning of which can be understood to cover user-generated remixes 
and mash-ups that go beyond traditional quotations and parodies. In Deckmyn 
and Pelham, the CJEU established the rule that the meaning of limitation 
concepts listed in Article 5(3) of the ISD had to be determined by considering 
the usual meaning of those concepts in everyday language, while also taking 
into account the legislative context in which they occur and the purposes of 
 
70 Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62013CA0201 ¶ 26 
(Sept. 3, 2014); Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH, 2011 E.C.R. I-12533 ¶ 132. 
71 Cf. TRIAILLE ET AL., supra note 11, at 465 72, 476 81. 
72 Admittedly, this solution leads to the dilemma that a creative form of use is subjected to the 
obligation to pay equitable remuneration. Traditionally, this has not been the case. Cf. Hilty & Senftleben, 
supra note 63, 328 29. However, see the broader concept of a general use privilege for creative reuse (not 
limited to UGC) developed by Geiger, supra note 67, 443 54; Christophe Geiger, Statutory Licenses as 
Enabler of Creative Uses, in REMUNERATION OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS: REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF 
NEW BUSINESS MODELS 305, 308 18 (Kung-Chung Liu & Reto M. Hilty eds., 2017); Christophe Geiger, 
Promoting Creativity Through Copyright Limitations, Reflections on the Concept of Exclusivity in 
Copyright Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515, 541 44 (2010), who proposes a remunerated statutory 
limitation for commercial creative uses, administrated by an independent regulation authority which could 
solve ex post disputes between original and derivative creators on the price to be paid for the 
transformative use via mediation.  
73 As to lessons which the EU could learn from the U.S. in this respect, see Martin R.F. Senftleben, 
Comparative Approaches to Fair Use: An Important Impulse for Reforms in EU Copyright Law, in 
METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 30, 30 67 (G.B. Dinwoodie ed., 2013). 
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the rules of which they are part.74 Against this background, Article 5(3)(k) of 
the ISD is of particular interest. The provision allows Member States to set 
limits to the right of reproduction and the right of communication to the 
5(3)(k) of the ISD also permits the exemption of use for the purpose of 
a purpose that is also listed in Article 17(7) of the 
DSMD. 
The Merriam-
literary, artistic, musical, or architectural work that imitates the style of 
75 
76 Similarly, the Collins English 
 work of art that imitates the style of 
77 
The aspect of mixing pre-existing materials and using portions of different 
works is of particular importance to the UGC debate. In many cases, the 
remix of pre-
that mix different source materials and combine selected parts of pre-existing 
works. 
Existing EU copyright law, thus, already contains a concept that can 
serve as a basis for the introduction of a new copyright limitation for UGC 
that goes beyond the traditional right of quotation and the traditional 
exemption of parody.78 Until now, EU Member States have not made 
effective use of this option to regulate UGC at the national level. Instead of 
clearly articulating the intention to create a UGC copyright limitation when 
permit
 
74 Case C-201/13, Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds VZW/Vandersteen, ¶ 19 2014 E.C.J.; Case C-
476/17, Pelham, ¶ 70 2019 E.C.J. 
75 Pastiche, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/pastiche. 
76 Id. 
77 Pastiche, COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/pastiche. 
78 Cf. Emily Hudson, The Pastiche Exception in Copyright Law: A Case of Mashed-Up Drafting?, 
INTELL. PROP. Q., 346, 348 52, 362 64 (2017), which confirms that the elastic, flexible meaning of the 
term pastiche  is capable of encompassing the utilization or assemblage of pre-existing works in new 
works.  In the same sense, Florian Pötzlberger, Pastiche 2.0: Remixing im Lichte des Unionsrechts, 
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT 675, 681 (2018). See also QUINTAIS, 
supra note 69, at 235, who points out that the concept of pastiche  can be understood to go beyond a 
mere imitation of style. In line with the results of the study tabled by TRIAILLE ET AL., supra note 11, 534
41. Quintais, nonetheless, expresses a preference for legislative reform. See QUINTAIS, supra note 69, at 
237. 
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national legislation without explaining its relevance to UGC creation and 
dissemination. Article 18b of the Dutch Copyright Act, for example, exempts 
the reproduction and communication to th
element of this copyright limitation in the context of UGC and providing 
guidelines for its application.79 As a result, the exemption of pastiche can 
hardly be expected to support amateur creators embarking on the remix of 
pre-existing material. To remedy this shortcoming, EU Member States 
DSM Directive. They should seize the opportunity to supplement their 
national portfolio of copyright limitations with a pastiche exemption and 
clarify in this context that this use privilege is intended to cover UGC.80  
In national systems which already provide for the exemption of 
pastiches, the courts can achieve this result as well. Accepting the pastiche 
provision as a valid defense against infringement arguments in UGC cases, 
they can pave the way for the recognition of the exemption of pastiches as a 
copyright limitation covering user-generated remixes of protected works. 
The courts also have a crucial role to play in the creation of corresponding 
revenue streams. In fact, a court-made obligation to pay equitable 
remuneration is not an anomaly in the European copyright tradition. In a 1999 
case concerning the Technical Information Library Hanover, the German 
copying and dispatching scientific articles on request by single persons and 
industrial undertakings even th
activities.81 To ensure the payment of equitable remuneration, the Court 
deduced a payment obligation from the three-step test in international 
copyright law and permitted the continuation of the service on the condition 
that equitable remuneration be paid.82 
Under harmonized EU copyright law, the CJEU adopted a similar 
approach. In Technische Universität Darmstadt, the Court recognized an 
 
79 For a discussion of the objectives underlying the adoption of this copyright limitation in the 
Netherlands, see Martin R.F. Senftleben, Quotations, Parody and Fair Use, in A CENTURY OF DUTCH 
COPYRIGHT LAW AUTEURSWET 1912 2012 359, 365 (P.B. Hugenholtz, A.A. Quaedvlieg, D.J.G. Visser 
eds., 2012). Also see the official government document explaining the implementation of the Information 
Society Directive, Tweede Kamer 2001 2002, 28 482, Nr. 3 (Memorie van Toelichting), 53. As to similar 
experiences in the UK, see Hudson, supra note 78, at 351 52. 
80 As to guidelines for a sufficiently flexible application of the pastiche exemption in the light of 
the underlying guarantee of free expression, see Hudson, supra note 78, at 362 64. 
81 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 25, 1999, case I ZR 118/96, TIB 
HANNOVER, Juristenzeitung 1999, 1000 (Ger.). 
82 Id. at 1005 07. 
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83 of libraries to digitize books in their holdings for the 
purpose of making these digital copies available via dedicated reading 
terminals on the library premises. To counterbalance the creation of this 
broad use privilege, the Court deemed it necessary in light of the three-step 
test in Article 5(5) of the ISD to insist on the payment of equitable 
remuneration. Discussing compliance of German legislation with this 
requirement, the Court was satisfied that the conditions of the three-step test 
were met because German libraries had to pay adequate remuneration for the 
act of making works available on dedicated terminals after digitization.84 
Hence, it is not unusual for courts in the EU to establish an obligation 
to pay equitable remuneration with regard to use privileges that have a broad 
scope. The courts derive the obligation to pay equitable remuneration from 
the three-step test in international and EU copyright law.85 Considering this 
practice, there can be little doubt that judges in EU Member States that 
already provide for an exemption of pastiches could supplement this use 
privilege with an obligation to pay equitable remuneration when it comes to 
user-generated pastiches that do not reflect sufficient creative effort to fall 
online platforms. This solution has the advantage of providing room for the 
evolution of UGC platforms that focus on content remixes and mash-ups that 
fall within the scope of the described broadened pastiche exemption or 
traditional copyright limitations for the purposes of quotation or parody. 
Article 17(7) of the DSMD, thus, creates a habitat for UGC that is beyond 
the reach of the prevailing prohibition and licensing logic of the new EU 
legislation. 
D.  Reverse Filtering Logic 
Admittedly, the escape route of Article 17(7) of the DSMD does not 
entail a full immunity from filtering obligations. Even if a UGC platform 
provider decides to focus on permitted quotations, parodies, and pastiches, it 
 
83 Case C-117/13, Technische Universität Darmstadt, ¶ 48, 2014 E.C.J. 
84 See id. 
85 See the Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works, art. 9(2), Sept. 9, 
1886, S. TREATY DOC. 99 27, 828 U.N.T.S 222, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, and WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 10, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 
105 17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121 at the International Level, and European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union, Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5(5), 2001 O.J. (L 167), in EU copyright law. For 
commentary, see Christophe Geiger, Daniel Gervais & Martin Senftleben, The Three-Step Test Revisited: 
How to Use the Test s Flexibility in National Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT L L. REV. 581, 581 626 
(2014); MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT LAW (Kluwer Law International 2004). 
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will still be necessary to introduce algorithmic enforcement measures to 
separate the wheat from the chaff. The platform provider will have to 
distinguish between permissible pastiche and prohibited piracy. Nonetheless, 
the robust use privileges for UGC in Article 17(7) of the DSMD offer 
important impulses for the development of content identification systems that 
seek to find creative input that renders the upload permissible instead of 
focusing on third-party content that makes the upload problematic.86 The 
exemption of quotations, parodies, and pastiches paves the way for a 
markedly different approach to the assessment of content. Instead of focusing 
on traces of protected third-party content in UGC (and starting points for 
blocking content), it is decisive whether the user has added sufficient own 
creativity to arrive at a permissible form of UGC.  
It remains to be seen whether (and how) this reverse filtering logic can 
be implemented in practice.87 It is conceivable, for instance, that users upload 
not only their final pastiche but also a file containing exclusively the self-
created material which they mingled with protected third-party content. In 
case of separable input (the funny animal video on the one hand, the added 
background music on the other), this allows the inclusion of the user creation 
as a separate content item in the identification system. In this way, the system 
88 
alculating 
the ratio of own content to third-party content. In addition, the potential of 
artificial intelligence and self-learning algorithms must not be 
underestimated. Filtering machines may be able to learn from decisions on 
content permissibility taken by humans. As a result, algorithmic content 
screening could become more sophisticated. It may lead to content 
identification systems that are capable of deciding easy cases and flagging 
difficult cases which could then be subject to human review.89  
 
86 Cf. Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 1093 96. 
87 For critical comments on the ability of automated systems to distinguish between an infringing 
copy and a permissible quotation, parody, or pastiche, see Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use 
Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH., 41, 56 (2001); Mark A. Lemley, 
Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 110 11 (2007). See 
generally Yu, supra note 66. 
88 As to the creation of digital reference files in content identification systems, see Lauren G. 
Gallo, The (Im)possibility of Standard Technical Measures  for UGC Websites, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS, 
283, 296 (2011); Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 41, at 513 14. 
89 Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 1096 98. 
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E.  Guidelines for Calculating Pastiche Levies 
The prospect of a reverse filtering logic following from robust use 
privileges for UGC offers useful reference points for calculating the right 
amount of equitable remuneration for pastiches reflecting user creativity that 
does not allow the invocation of the unremunerated exemption of quotations 
and parodies. In practice, filtering systems seeking to identify content 
elements that justify the unauthorized upload will only be attractive to 
platform providers if the costs involved are lower than the costs of 
implementing a conventional, prohibition-driven filtering system. After all, 
providers of UGC platforms are most often commercial, profit-oriented 
entities and not freedom of expression charities. 
Hence, the decision on pastiche levies concerns not only the 
determination of an appropriate fee but also the creation of an appropriate 
incentive scheme.90 Lawmakers seeking to encourage investment in filter 
technology that follows the described reverse logic identifying creative 
user input that renders the upload permissible instead of focusing on third-
party content that makes the upload problematic would have to establish 
pastiche remuneration fees that are lower than regular license fees. 
Otherwise, it will be cheaper for the platform industry to subscribe to the 
traditional filtering model and block content whenever an upload contains 
traces of protected works of third parties. Moreover, it is to be considered in 
the light of freedom of expression that the creative effort invested in a user-
generated pastiche justifies a lower fee when compared with a verbatim copy 
lacking any creative user input.   
F.  Procedural Safeguards 
A final piece of the algorithmic enforcement puzzle concerns procedural 
safeguards against excessive content filtering. Until the described incentive 
scheme leads to the availability of sophisticated filtering systems capable of 
distinguishing between permissible pastiche and prohibited piracy, these 
procedural safeguards play a central role. Article 17(9) of the DSMD 
effective and expeditious 
for users who are confronted with unjustified content blocking.91 Complaints 
without undue delay. 92 duly 
 
90 For a more general discussion of incentives for the development of more balanced algorithmic 
enforcement tools, see Martin Husovec, The Promises of Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement: Takedown 
or Staydown? Which Is Superior? And Why?, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53, 76 84 (2018). 
91 DSMD, supra note 4. 
92 Id. 
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justify the reasons for their requests 93 vis-à-vis content blocking and 
removal. In the light of this substantiation of the filtering request, the UGC 
platform will have to take a final decision on the status of the upload at issue.  
This procedural safeguard does not show much promise for the 
preservation of the quotation, parody, and pastiche habitat. As the platform 
provider runs the risk of liability for infringement, a generous interpretation 
of these copyright limitations serving freedom of expression seems unlikely, 
even though a broad application of the right of quotation and the parody 
exemption would be in line with CJEU jurisprudence.94 The elastic timeframe 
without undue delay 95 differs 
markedly from an obligation to let blocked content reappear promptly. As it 
may take quite a while until a decision on the infringing nature of content is 
taken, the complaint-and-redress mechanism may appear unattractive to 
users from the outset.  
A high degree of efficiency and reliability is thus crucial to the success 
of the measure. Evidence from the application of the counternotice system in 
the U.S.96 shows quite clearly that users are unlikely to file complaints in the 
first place.97 If users must wait a relatively long time for a final result, it is 
foreseeable that a complaint-and-redress system is incapable of safeguarding 
freedom of expression. In the context of UGC, it is often crucial to react 
quickly to current news and film, book, and music releases. If the complaint-
and-redress mechanism finally yields the insight that a lawful content remix 
or mash-up has been blocked, the decisive moment for an affected quotation, 
parody, or pastiche may already have passed.98 
 
93 Id. 
94 The court emphasized the need to achieve a fair balance  between, in particular, the rights and 
interests of authors on the one hand, and the rights of users of protected subject-matter on the other.  Case 
C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, 2014 E.C.R. 62013CJ0201, ¶ 26; see also Case C-145/10, Painer v. 
Standard VerlagsGmbH, 2011 E.C.R. I-12533, ¶ 132.  
95 DSMD, supra note 4, at art. 17(9). 
96 As to this feature of the notice-and-takedown system in U.S. copyright law, see Peguera, supra 
note 12, at 481. 
97 See the study conducted by Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or Chilling 
Effects ? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006), showing, among other things, that 30% of DMCA 
takedown notices were legally dubious, and that 57% of DMCA notices were filed against competitors. 
While the DMCA offers the opportunity to file counter-notices and rebut unjustified takedown requests, 
Urban and Quilter find that instances in which this mechanism is used are relatively rare. However, 
compare the critical comments on the methodology used for the study and a potential self-selection bias 
arising from the way in which the analyzed notices have been collected by Frederick W. Mostert & Martin 
B. Schwimmer, Notice and Takedown for Trademarks, 101 TRADEMARK REP., 249, 259 60 (2011). 
98 Apart from the time aspect, complaint systems may also be implemented in a way that 
discourages widespread use. Cf. Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 41, 507 08, 514. In addition, the 
question arises whether users filing complaints are exposed to copyright infringement claims in case the 
2020] Institutionalized Algorithmic Enforcement 327 
 
Against this background, it is advisable to make the submission of a 
complaint against content filtering as simple as possible. If users must fill out 
a complicated form and add lengthy explanations to substantiate their 
request, Article 17(9) of the DSMD will remain a dead letter. To avoid this 
loss of an important safeguard against excessive algorithmic enforcement, 
the blocking of UGC should automatically lead to the opening of a dialogue 
blocking is unj  . . my 
 . 99 
The user should then be able to launch the complaint by simply clicking the 
box with the applicable argument supporting the review request.100 Ideally, 
this click should lead to the appearance of the contested content on the 
platform. As copyright owners will seek to minimize the period of online 
availability of allegedly infringing content, this appearance ensures that they 
101 
Obviously, the crux of this regulatory model lies in the question of 
liability for the appearance of potentially infringing content until a final 
decision is taken on the status of the content at issue. As Article 17(9) of the 
DSMD also gives users access to impartial out-of-court settlement 
mechanisms and, if this does not help, access to the courts, the period of 
uncertainty about the status of the content may be quite long. If UGC 
platforms are liable for harm flowing from content availability during this 
period, they will eschew the introduction of the described regulatory model. 
To solve this dilemma, platforms must not be exposed to liability for content 
which, in the end, is found to infringe copyright. Therefore, a liability shield 
should be available at least when the platform provider can demonstrate that 
she has checked whether the user has not simply clicked one of the complaint 
buttons to deceive the system and make content available which, evidently, 
is mere piracy and remote from constituting a permissible quotation, parody, 
or pastiche.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The institutionalization of algorithmic enforcement in the DSM 
Directive is worrisome. As the internet is the primary information medium in 
 
user-generated quotation, parody or pastiche at issue (which the user believes to be legitimate) finally 
proves to amount to copyright infringement. Cf. Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 1092. 
99 Cf. Quintais et al., supra note 49, at 5. 
100 Id. 
101 DSMD, supra note 4, at art. 17, ¶ 9. 
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Western societies, it is surprising that the EU officially accepts and even 
mandates the application of automated content filtering. In comparison 
with voluntary decisions of private companies to introduce content 
identification systems, the new EU legislation appears as the original sin of 
content censorship obligations in Western democracies. Nonetheless, the 
evaluation of this legal development need not be entirely negative. The 
institutionalization of algorithmic enforcement offers the chance of requiring 
not only the application of filtering tools but also the preservation of user 
freedoms. The new EU legislation need not culminate in the blocking of each 
and every item that contains traces of protected third-party content. Instead, 
it can pave the way for the development of sophisticated content evaluation 
systems that seek to identify quotations, parodies, and pastiches capable of 
justifying the unauthorized content upload.  
While there is no obligation to align voluntary, private filtering systems 
with the public interest in breathing space for use privileges that support 
freedom of expression and information, the institutionalization of content 
filtering can make the preservation of relevant user freedoms a standard 
feature of algorithmic enforcement. However, this positive side effect of the 
institutionalization will only come to light if EU Member States are wise 
enough to implement the DSM Directive in a way that allows the permission 
logic underlying the exemption of quotations, parodies, and pastiches to 
prevail over the prohibition logic of conventional filtering systems. Viewed 
from this perspective, there is still hope that the new algorithmic enforcement 
obligations in the EU will not disfigure copyright law beyond all recognition.  
